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THE PLENARY POWER BACKGROUND OF
CURTISS- WRIGHT
SARAH

H.

CLEVELAND*

INTRODUCTION

In his article The Transformation of the Constitutional
Regime of ForeignRelations,' Professor Ted White argues that
the early twentieth century saw a major shift in constitutional
understandings and expectations regarding the distribution of
authority in foreign affairs. According to White, until that era
the foreign affairs power, like all other powers under the
Constitution, were considered subject to a formalistic,
essentialist world view in which powers were distributed by the
text of the Constitution according to clear principles of
federalism and separation of powers.
Congress and the
President could only exercise powers in this area that had been
dedicated to them by the text of the Constitution or that were
reasonably implied therefrom, with such exercise subject to the
other constraints enumerated in the Constitution. Article II
treaties made by the President with the advice and consent of
the Senate were assumed to be the primary medium for the
exercise of the foreign affairs power, and the treaty power also
was assumed to be subject to the constraints of separation of
powers, individual rights, and federalism.
White argues compellingly that these assumptions became
muddled in the early twentieth century, as contrary visions of
the foreign affairs power found expression in a series of cases
addressing the constitutional status of executive agreements,
the effect of treaties on "reserved" state powers, and the
primacy of executive branch determinations in foreign
sovereign immunity cases. Thus, in Missouri v. Holland,2 the
Supreme Court abandoned the theory that powers reserved to
the states under the, Tenth Amendment placed meaningful
* Assistant Professor, University of Texas School of Law. J.D., Yale Law
School; M.St., Oxford University; A.B., Brown University. This paper offers
preliminary thoughts on a larger, ongoing project regarding the historical origins
of the plenary power doctrine.
1. G. Edward White, The Transformation of the Constitutional Regime of
Foreign Relations, 85 VA. L. REV. 1 (1999).

2.

252 U.S. 416 (1920).
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limits on the exercise of the treaty power. In United States v.
Belmont' and United States v. Pink,4 the Court confirmed the
hegemony of the national government over foreign affairs, and
drastically undermined the Senate's constitutional role in
treaty making by upholding a unilateral executive agreement
settling foreign claims. Similarly, with the decisions in Ex
Parte Peru5 and Mexico v. Hoffman,6 the Supreme Court
rejected the traditional role of the courts in independently
evaluating sovereign immunity in favor of deference to
executive determinations in this area. Finally, the decision in
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.7 articulated an
expansive theory of executive hegemony, grounded in the
concept of the Executive as the "sole organ"' in foreign affairs.
Each of these cases, White argues, resulted in the transfer of
power from the states and Congress to the executive branch,
such that "by the late 1930s federal executive hegemony in
foreign relations had become constitutional orthodoxy."9 In the
process, foreign affairs law was divorced from the assumptions
of the orthodox, essentialist regime.
White's analysis reveals important connections among the
early-twentieth-century foreign affairs decisions and identifies
a significant and undeniable trend in the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence during this period. Undoubtedly, decisions such
as Missouri v. Holland and Curtiss-Wright clarified the
distribution of powers in foreign affairs and crystallized many
modern assumptions about the foreign affairs power in
American jurisprudence. White's analysis of this evolution
significantly advances our understanding of contemporary
doctrine in this area. Nevertheless, we should be cautious not
to overdramatize the extent of the transformation, and it
strikes me that neither the nineteenth-century orthodoxy, nor
the assumptions that replaced it, are as unambiguous as White
suggests.
Take the notion of federalism as a limitation on the treaty
power before the decision in Missouri v. Holland, for example.

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

301 U.S. 324 (1937).
315 U.S. 203 (1942).
318 U.S. 578 (1943).
324 U.S. 30 (1945).
299 U.S. 304 (1936).
Id. at 320.
White, supra note 1, at 5.
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From the drafting of the Constitution, the relationship among
the treaty power, the Supremacy Clause, and the reserved
powers was ambiguous, leading even states' rights proponents
such as William Rawle to argue that, in contrast to the system
under the Articles of Confederation, "[i]n our present
Constitution no limitations [on the treaty power] were held
necessary." ° As White acknowledges, although the Supreme
Court had addressed several cases involving conflicts between
treaty provisions and existing state legislation during the
nineteenth century, the Court had never invalidated a treaty
provision on the grounds that it conflicted with reserved state
powers." To the contrary, at least with respect to the rights of
aliens, the Court had repeatedly invoked the treaty power to
invalidate legislation in areas traditionally addressed by
states, including statutes of limitations, 2 confiscation,1 3 and
escheat of land. 4 As early as 1832, the Supreme Court had
held that the United States, by the exercise of the treaty power,
had precluded the application of state legislation in Indian
territory. 5 Furthermore, the Court throughout the nineteenth
century construed the treaty power as bestowing broad
authority on Congress to create non-Article III courts, 6 to
govern Indian tribes, 7 and to dissolve property rights 18 -

10. WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
65 (2d ed. 1829).
11. See White, supra note 1, at 27 & n.72. In the only
case in which the

Court upheld the enforcement of a state law in the face of a treaty, see Provost v.
Greneaux, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 1 (1856), the treaty's operation was expressly limited

"to the States of the Union whose laws permit it." White, supra note 1, at 24-25
n.73 (quoting 1853 treaty).
12. See Hopkirk v. Bell, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 454 (1806).
13. See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796).
14. See Blythe v. Hinckley, 180 U.S. 333, 340 (1901); Geofroy v. Riggs, 133
U.S. 258 (1890); Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483 (1879); Chirac v. Chirac, 15
U.S. (2 Wheat.) 259, 275 (1817).
15. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). The Jackson

Administration had argued that the United States would not "countenance ... an
independent [Cherokee] government" and that the Cherokees must "submit to the
laws of... states." Andrew Jackson, Message to Congress (Dec. 8, 1829), quoted
in G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-

1835, at 718 (1988). Justice Marshall rejected this position, finding that prior
treaties established a Cherokee territory "in which the laws of Georgia can have
no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter." 31 U.S. (6 Pet.)
at 561.
16.

See American Ins. v. Cantor, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828); see also In re

Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891).
17.

See Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 567 (1883); Worcester v. Georgia,
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powers which otherwise could have been considered beyond the
scope of Article I. In other words, although the Court's rhetoric
in decisions such as Geofroy v. Riggs 9 respected states' rights
in this area, in practice federalism-and the Constitution as a
whole-had placed few meaningful limits on the exercise of the
treaty power.
The subsequent impact of Missouri v. Holland similarly
should not be overstated. Despite Justice Holmes's language of
expansive federal authority, federalism has retained force at
least as a political limit on the treaty power, particularly in the
human rights area. Federalism concerns significantly shaped
the United States's negotiations over the terms of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,2" were a primary
motivating force behind the Bricker Amendment in the 1950s,21
and formed the basis for opposition to U.S. ratification of the
International Labour Organisation Conventions.22
More
recently, federalism concerns have resulted in the attachment
of a variety of reservations, understandings, and provisos to
human rights conventions, 3 and remain a primary obstacle to
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832).
18. See Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890).
19. 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890) ("It would not be contended that [the treaty
power] extends so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids, or a change in
the character of the government or in that of one of the States, or a cession of any
portion of the territory of the latter, without its consent.").
20. See generally NATALIE H. KAUFMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES AND THE
SENATE: A HISTORY OF OPPOSITION (1990).
21. See Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The
Ghost of SenatorBricker, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 341 (1995).
22. See Stephen I. Schlossberg, United States Participation in the ILO:
Redefining the Role, 11 COMP. LAB. L.J. 48, 68 (1989).
23. See Henkin, supra note 21. The United States's 1951 reservation to the
Charter of the Organization of American States, for example, provided that
nothing in the Charter should be understood as enlarging the powers of the
federal government or limiting the powers reserved to the states under the
Constitution. See OAS Charter, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 2484. The United
States's ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
similarly included the somewhat tortured declaration "that the United States
understands that this Covenant shall be implemented by the Federal Government
to the extent that it exercises legislative and judicial jurisdiction over the matters
covered therein and otherwise by the state and local governments. The Federal
Government shall take measures appropriate to the Federal system to the end
that the competent authorities of the state or local governments may take
appropriate measures for the fulfillment of the Covenant." International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S.TREATY Doc. NO. 95-2
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U.S. ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child.24
Furthermore, recent scholarship has attempted to resurrect
federalism limits on the treaty power.28
A complete treatment of the many interesting doctrinal
developments noted in White's article is well beyond the scope
of this essay. I will therefore focus my comments on one
significant element of continuity between the early-twentiethcentury foreign affairs jurisprudence and its predecessors, that
is, the nineteenth-century origins of the doctrine of inherent
plenary power 6 in Curtiss-Wright.
I.

THE DOCTRINE OF INHERENT PLENARY POWER AND
CURTISS- WRIGHT

Justice Sutherland's majority opinion in Curtiss-Wright
represents the apex of the doctrine of plenary executive power
over foreign affairs27 and provides critical support for Professor
White's thesis. The case presented the question whether a
statute authorizing the Executive to prohibit arms sales abroad
violated the nondelegation doctrine. In the opinion, Sutherland
drew a clear distinction between constitutional analysis of
domestic and foreign relations. 8
While accepting that
authority over domestic relations was based on traditional
concepts of limited government derived from enumerated and

(1966).
24. See, e.g., Susan Kilbourne, U.S. Failure to Ratify the U.N. Convention on
the Rights of the Child: Playing Politics with Children's Rights, 6 TRANSNAT'L L.
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 437, 440-56 (1996).
25. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism,
97 MICH. L. REV. 390 (1998); Thomas Healy, Is Missouri v. Holland Still Good
Law? Federalismand the Treaty Power, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1726 (1998).
26. The concept of plenary power has a range of meanings in constitutional
jurisprudence extending well beyond the foreign affairs arena. For the purposes
of this paper, plenary power is used to refer to power that is dedicated to the
exclusive discretion of one branch of government, which derives from extratextual sources of authority, such as international law or sovereignty, and which
is largely insulated from judicial review.
27. A number of earlier decisions contained language that seemed to support
broad executive authority over foreign affairs. See, e.g., In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1
(1890); The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862); Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12
Wheat.) 19 (1827); Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804). None of these
cases, however, embraced the principle as explicitly, or with as little concern for
an enumerated-powers grounding, as Curtiss-Wright.
28. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315
(1936).
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reserved powers, Sutherland simultaneously unhinged the
foreign affairs power from any such constraints.29 Authority
over foreign affairs, he argued, did not derive from the text of
the Constitution, but was a power inherent in sovereignty: °
It results that the investment of the federal government
with the powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon
the affirmative grants of the Constitution. The powers to
declare and wage war, to conclude peace, to make treaties,
to maintain diplomatic relations with other sovereignties, if
they had never been mentioned in the Constitution, would
have vested in the federal
government as necessary
31
concomitants of nationality.
Sutherland thus abandoned the traditional distinction
between enumerated, separated, and reserved powers and
replaced it with a distinction between domestic and foreign
affairs, with the latter derived from a broad theory of inherent
plenary power that he ultimately rooted in the executive
branch. 2 Participation by the other branches in this power
was "significantly limited."3 In light of "the very delicate,
plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ
of the federal government in the field of international
relations,"34 he concluded, a broad delegation of authority from
Congress to the President in this area did not violate the
nondelegation doctrine.
Leaving aside the extensive debate over Justice
Sutherland's theory of history, 5 the decision is notable for its
striking contrast to the domestic opinions of the day. Two

29. See id. at 315-16 ("The broad statement that the federal government can
exercise no powers except those specifically enumerated in the Constitution, and
such implied powers as are necessary and proper ... is categorically true only in
respect of our internal affairs.").
30. See id. at 316-17.
31. Id. at 318.
32. See id. at 319.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 320.
35. See CHARLES A. LOFGREN,The Foreign Relations Power: United States
v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An Historical Reassessment, in
GOVERNMENT FROM REFLECTION AND CHOICE 167 (1986); L. Fisher, Evolution of
Presidentialand CongressionalPowers in ForeignAffairs, in LOUIS W. KOENIG ET
AL., CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENCY, AND THE TAIwAN RELATIONS ACT 20 (1985);
David M. Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice
Sutherland's Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467 (1946).
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terms earlier, the Court had decided Panama Refining Co. v.
Ryan36 and A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,37
the only two cases in which the Court has ever invalidated
legislation as an unconstitutional delegation of congressional
authority. And only six months before, Justice Sutherland
himself had authored the opinion in Carterv. Carter Coal Co.,38
striking down labor legislation as violating Congress's powers
under the Commerce Clause. All of these decisions were based
on highly formalistic views of the enumerated authority of the
federal government-views that Sutherland deemed irrelevant
to the foreign affairs power in Curtiss-Wright.
Professor White is correct that the decision in CurtissWright forms the cornerstone of modern day foreign affairs
exceptionalism, 39 and the reasoning of the decision certainly
suggests a radical break with an essentialist view of
Here again, however, the
constitutional jurisprudence.
transformation wrought by Curtiss-Wright may be more
limited than White asserts. Decisions of the day suggest that
Curtiss-Wright did not radically transform executive power
over foreign affairs. Moreover, the theory of inherent plenary
power over foreign affairs that Sutherland articulated had
lengthy roots in nineteenth-century jurisprudence.
II.

CONTINUITY WITH CONTEMPORARY JURISPRUDENCE

Despite Justice Sutherland's expansive rhetoric regarding
the "sole organ" power, Curtiss-Wright did not introduce an era
of "executive hegemony" absent the wishes of Congress, nor did
it eliminate the role of the courts in foreign affairs. CurtissWright involved a case, not where the President acted
independently from Congress, but where he acted pursuant to
an express congressional delegation of authority and a
"uniform, long-continued and undisputed legislative practice."4"
In this sense, Curtiss-Wright may have foreshadowed the
demise of the nondelegation doctrine in constitutional
jurisprudence generally, but it did not abolish the separation of
36. 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
37. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
38. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
39. See G. Edward White, Observations on the Turning of Foreign Affairs
Jurisprudence,70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109 (1999).

40. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 329 (1936).
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powers in foreign affairs. As Justice Jackson later noted in his
famous concurrence to Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, the decision on its face stands for the unremarkable
proposition that, when acting together, the Executive and
Congress enjoy substantial discretion in this area.4'
Decisions of the era confirm that Curtiss-Wright neither
clearly established unilateral executive hegemony nor
obliterated the judicial role in foreign affairs. Indeed, decisions
rejecting unilateral executive actions were common in the
1930s. In Cook v. United States," decided in 1933, for example,
the Court held that a treaty with Great Britain barred the
Executive from seeking a criminal prosecution. Only a month
before the decision in Curtiss-Wright, the Court held that the
President had no inherent authority to extradite in the absence
of legislation or a treaty.43 And in 1939 in Perkins v. Elg,44 the
Court interpreted a treaty against the wishes of the Executive
to bar a deportation. Perhaps most importantly, a decade and
a half later in Youngstown, the Court rejected an inherent
powers argument and applied a highly formalistic concept of
separation of powers to conclude that President Truman's
seizure of the steel mills in the heat of the Korean War
constituted an unauthorized legislative act. 4'
The Court,
moreover, repeatedly has confirmed its authority to review the
legality of governmental action in the foreign affairs area,4 6
though often with significant deference to executive action.
Nor, of course, was the concept of executive primacy in
foreign affairs unknown in the pre-Curtiss-Wright era. -Since
the famous debates between "Pacificus" and "Helvedius," some
jurists, lawmakers, and commentators had asserted that the
foreign affairs power was exclusively an executive function,

41. See 343 U.S. 579, 635 n.2 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
42. 288 U.S. 102 (1933).
43. See Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 8 (1936).
44. 307 U.S. 325, 335-42 (1939).
45. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 579.
46. See Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221
(1986); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S.
654 (1981); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); United
States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 263 (1967); Aptheker v. United States, 378 U.S. 500
(1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Kinsella v. United States ex rel.
Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960); Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960); Kent v.
Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
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subsumed by the "Executive Power."4 Hamilton went so far as
to argue that, at least where the common defense was
concerned, the power "ought to exist without limitation ....
The circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are
infinite, and for this reason no constitutional shackles can
wisely be imposed on the power to which the care of it is
committed.""
These debates are familiar to students of the foreign
affairs power. Perhaps less familiar, however, is the extent to
which the doctrine of plenary power over foreign relations had
been developed nearly four decades prior to Curtiss-Wright.

III. THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY INHERENT POWERS DOCTRINE
Although the concept of executive plenary power over
foreign relations found its fullest expression in Curtiss-Wright,
Justice Sutherland's method of finding extra-constitutional
authority for federal action over foreign affairs was entirely
familiar to Supreme Court jurisprudence. Indeed, the doctrine
of inherent plenary power articulated by Sutherland had roots
deep into the early nineteenth century, particularly in judicial
decisions relating to Indians, aliens, and territories. Most of
the Supreme Court decisions in these areas addressed the
exercise of congressional, rather than executive, authority.
Nevertheless, they formed the basis for the theory of an extraconstitutional foreign affairs authority, derived from concepts
of international law and sovereignty, and not clearly subject to
traditional constitutional constraints or to judicial review,
which found ultimate expression in Curtiss-Wright. To the
extent that there has been a "divorce" of foreign affairs law
from
traditional
essentialist
views
of constitutional
interpretation, I would argue, the divergence occurred during
the course of the nineteenth century, and culminated in a
series of cases decided forty years before Curtiss-Wright.
Controversies involving Indians, aliens, and territories
shared a number of characteristics that led them to be treated

47. See EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT'S CONTROL OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS 8-27 (1917).
48. THE FEDERALIST NO. 23, at 147 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 31, at 193 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob
E. Cooke ed., 1961).
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by the courts as foreign relations issues from an early date.49
All three areas involved non-citizens ° and implicated lands
outside the states of the Union. All three were also largely
unaddressed by the Constitution's text and thus posed
challenges for the enumerated powers doctrine.
The
Constitution, for example, mentions Native Americans in only
three places,51 and, of these, only the Indian Commerce Clause
is plausibly read to bestow independent authority on Congress
to legislate over Native American tribes. The Constitution
similarly is silent regarding which branch, if any, retains the
power to regulate immigration. Plausible enumerated sources
for such authority were the foreign Commerce Clause, 2 the
Naturalization Clause," the War Powers Clause,54 and the
Migration Clause.5 Finally, Article IV authorizes Congress to
govern and dispose of "the Territory... belonging to the
United States,"56 and the power to acquire territory can be
inferred from the power to enter into treaties, 7 to admit new
49. The Marshall Court frequently emphasized the foreign, diplomatic, and
occassionally warlike character of relations with the Indians. See, e.g., Worcester
v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559-60 (1832) ("The words 'treaty' and 'nation' are
words of our own language, selected in our diplomatic and legislative
proceedings .... We have applied them to Indians, as we have applied them to
the other nations of the earth. They are applied to all in the same sense."). But
see Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831) (though sovereign,
Indian tribes were "domestic dependent nations" and could not sue as "foreign
nations" in federal courts). Justice Sutherland identified in Curtiss-Wright "the
power to expel undesirable aliens" and "[t]he power to acquire territory by
discovery and occupation" as part of the foreign relations power of the United
States. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936).
50. Native Americans did not achieve full citizenship until 1924. See Act of
June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (1994)).
Residents of the later-acquired territories of Puerto Rico and the Philippines and
other aliens did not attain citizenship until 1952. See Act of June 27, 1952, ch. 1,
66 Stat. 266 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1402 (1994)).
51. "Indians not taxed" are excluded from population enumerations for
determining congressional representatives in Article I of the Constitution, and in
the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. CONST art. I, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. amend XIV,
§ 2. The Indian Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to "regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations... States ... and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 3. Other relevant powers include the treaty power and the war power.
52. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
53. See id. cl. 11.
54. See id. cl. 1.
55. See id. § 9, cl. 1 ("The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of
the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the
Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight.").
56. Id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
57. See id. art. II, § 2.
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states or to make war. The Constitution, however, is otherwise
silent regarding the United States's authority to acquire new
territory and to determine the legal status of such territory's
inhabitants.
Each of these areas became a source of
constitutional stress for the United States by the late 1800s,
and from this vacuum, the doctrine of inherent plenary power
emerged.
A. PlenaryPower over Indian Tribes
Chief Justice John Marshall observed in Cherokee Nation
v. Georgia that "the relation of the Indians to the United States
is marked by peculiar and cardinal distinctions which exist no
where else.""8 Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding Indian
tribes is generally neglected in foreign affairs analysis, likely
on the grounds that the Indian cases are sui generis.
Nevertheless, the nineteenth-century Indian cases confronted
the same difficulties in applying the Constitution to unfamiliar
contexts as the territory and alien cases, employed similar
rationales, and were relied upon to justify later decisions
regarding congressional authority in these other areas.
The doctrine of Congress's plenary authority over Native
Americans has its roots in the doctrine of discovery, articulated
by Chief Justice Marshall in 1823 in Johnson v. McIntosh.59
The case involved a conflict in title arising from the sale of
tribal lands to private individuals and the later transfer of the
same lands from the tribe by treaty to the United States
government. Thus, the case raised the question of the nature
of Native American sovereignty over their traditional lands.
While acknowledging the Native Americans' sovereign right to
possession of their territory, Marshall invoked the
international law doctrines of discovery and conquest-"that
discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it"°-to
conclude that Indian title was imperfect and could only be
transferred to the discovering power. In other words, the
United States, as a result of its accession to the authority of the
British Crown, had an "exclusive right to extinguish the Indian

58.
59.
60.

30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831).
21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
Id. at 574.
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title of occupancy, either by purchase or by conquest.""' This
claim being long recognized, Marshall continued, "[iit is not for
the Courts of this country to question the validity of this title,
or to sustain one which is incompatible with it." 2 By placing
absolute title over Native American lands in the United States,
and by suggesting that Congress's exercise of the power was
inappropriate for judicial review, Johnson v. McIntosh laid the
groundwork for the doctrine of plenary power to come.
During much of the nineteenth century, the United States
conducted relations with Native Americans through treaties
and considered the treaty power a primary basis for federal
legislation relating to Native Americans." In 1871, however,
Congress abolished the practice of treatying with Native
Americans. 4 By 1886, the Supreme Court was asked to
address the source of congressional authority, in the absence of
treaties, to govern Native American tribes.
United States v. Kagama6 1 involved the constitutionality of
a federal statute that extended United States criminal
jurisdiction to crimes committed between Native Americans in
As the Kagama Court noted, Congress
Indian country.
previously had adopted legislation regulating the conduct of
whites in Indian country, but had not purported to regulate
crimes between Native Americans on their own lands.6 6 In

61. Id. at 587.
62. Id. at 589. Marshall later suggested that the United States's claim to
ultimate title to Native American lands was not derived directly from the doctrine
of discovery, but was a pragmatic solution to the difficulty that possession by
these "fierce savages" posed:
However this restriction may be opposed to natural right, and to the
usages of civilized nations, yet, if it be indispensable to that system
under which the country has been settled... it may, perhaps, be
supported by reason, and certainly cannot be rejected by Courts of
justice.
Id. at 591-92.
63. See FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 208 (1982).
64. The Appropriations Act of 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (codified at,25
U.S.C. § 71 (1994)) provides as follows:
No Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States shall
be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power
with whom the United States may contract by treaty; but no obligation of
any treaty lawfully made and ratified with any such Indian nation or
tribe prior to March 3, 1871, shall be hereby invalidated or impaired.
Id.
65. 118 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1886).
66. See id. at 377-78.

CURTISS- WRIGHT

19991

1139

upholding the statute, Justice Miller observed that the
Constitution is relatively silent regarding relations between
the national government and the tribes.6 7 Miller rejected the
government's suggestion that the requisite authority could be
found in the Indian Commerce Clause6" and concluded that
none of the enumerated powers of the Constitution, including
the Territory Clause, conferred the power to legislate a code of
criminal law in this area. 9
Instead, Miller invoked the
°
doctrine of discovery to find that the power was a necessary
incident of United States sovereignty over the territories:
[Tihis power of Congress to organize territorial
governments, and make laws for their inhabitants, arises
not so much from [the Territory Clause ofl the
Constitution... as from the ownership of the country in
which the Territories are, and the right of exclusive
sovereignty which must exist in
71 the National Government,
and can be found nowhere else.
Miller closed with a sweeping statement of inherent federal
power:
The power of the General Government over these remnants
of a race once powerful, now weak and diminished in
numbers, is necessary to their protection, as well as to the
safety of those among whom they dwell. It must exist in
that government, because it never has existed anywhere
else, because the theatre of its exercise is within the
geographical limits of the United States, because it has
never been denied, and because it alone can enforce its laws
on all the tribes. 2
Thus, the Court established an extra-textual basis, rooted in
sovereignty, for the exercise of federal power. The scope of this
authority, however, remained uncertain. Because Kagama did

67. See id. at 378.

68. See id. at 378-79 ("[Ilt would be a very strained construction of this
clause, that a system of criminal laws for Indians living peaceably in their
reservations..

. was

authorized by the grant of power to regulate commerce with

the Indian tribes.").
69. See id. at 379.
70. See id. at 381-82.
71. Id. at 380.
72. Id. at 384-85.
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not involve an objection based on the violation of an individual
constitutional right, it is unclear whether the Court viewed this
implied power as limited by other provisions of the
Constitution. Similarly, although Miller cited an earlier case
for the proposition that courts would not examine the exercise
of Congress's power over Native Americans, he did not pursue
this line of argument.73
Although the power of Congress to legislate for the tribes
originally had derived from the treaty power, the Court in 1903
relied upon Kagama to conclude that Congress could adopt
legislation in direct abrogation of prior treaty agreements.
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock74 involved reservation lands that had
been set aside for the Kiowa and Comanche tribes by treaty in
1867. The treaty provided that the tribes could not be divested
of lands held in common without the consent of three-fourths of
the adult male Indians.75 In 1892, the requisite three-quarters
of the tribal members allegedly entered an agreement that
surrendered the tribes' rights to the reservation to the United
States.76 Under the agreement, a portion of the reservation
lands would be divided into allotments for individual Indians,
with the remaining two and a half million "surplus" acres to be
opened to white settlement.77 While Congress was considering
legislation to enact the allotment agreement, the tribes
objected, arguing that the 1892 agreement had been based on
false representations by the United States and that threequarters of the adult males had not acceded to it.75

The

Secretary of the Interior confirmed that the agreement had not
been signed by three-quarters of the adult male members.7 9
Nevertheless, Congress adopted legislation enacting the
allotment agreement, and in 1901, the President issued a
proclamation opening the surplus reservation lands to white
entry and settlement.8 ° Lone Wolf challenged the action in

73. See id. at 380-81 ("[Were the right and the propriety of exercising this
power now open to question, yet it is a question for the law-making and political
departments of the government, and not for the judicial.") (quoting United States
v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 572 (1846)).
74. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
75. See id. at 554.
76. See id. at 555.
77. See id.
78. See id. at 556.
79. See id. at 557.
80. See id. at 562-63.
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federal court, arguing that the agreement was invalid because
Congress lacked authority to open the reservation to white
settlement and that the allotment statute, if carried into effect,
would deprive the Indians of property without due process of
law under the Fifth Amendment.8 '
The Supreme Court rejected the challenge, finding that the
validity of the 1892 land agreement was irrelevant since
Congress enjoyed plenary authority to legislate Native
American land rights.82 Writing for the Court, Justice Edward
White cited the original Chinese Exclusion Case 3 for the
proposition that "it was never doubted that the power to
White further
abrogate [treaties] existed in Congress.'
asserted that Congress's plenary power to legislate for Indian
tribes precluded the Court from questioning the exercise of that
power or the validity of the 1892 agreement:
Plenary authority over the tribal relations of the Indians
has been exercised by Congress from the beginning, and the
power has always been deemed a political one, not subject to
be controlled by the judicial department of the government.
...

We must presume that Congress acted in perfect

good faith in the dealings with the Indians of which
complaint is made, and that the legislative branch of the
government exercised its best judgment in the premises. In
any event, as Congress possessed full power in the matter,
the judiciary cannot question or inquire into the motives
which prompted the enactment of this legislation. If injury
was occasioned.., by the use made by Congress of its
power, relief must be sought 85by an appeal to that body for
redress and not to the courts.
Thus, by the turn of the century, the Court had
annunciated an expansive theory of congressional authority
over Native Americans, which derived from concepts of
inherent powers and the international law of discovery, rather
than from any particular constitutional text. The Court

81.
82.
83.
U.S. 581
84.
85.

See id. at 561.
See id. at 565-66.
Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130
(1889).
Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 565-66 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 565, 568.
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elsewhere may have recognized that this authority was subject
to some constraints of the Constitution.8 6 But the decisions of
the era simultaneously suggested that relations with the
Indians raised "political questions" that the courts were
incompetent to address.8 7
B. PlenaryPower over Immigration
Like the question of congressional authority over the
tribes, the source of federal authority to regulate the admission
and expulsion of aliens remained uncertain until the Chinese
Exclusion Case and its progeny at the end of the nineteenth
century.88 These decisions provided critical support not only for
the concept of plenary power over Native Americans, as
discussed above, but for Justice Sutherland's theory of an
inherent, plenary executive power four decades later.8 9
The origins of the plenary power doctrine in immigration
may be seen in the debates over the Alien Act of 1798, in which
Hamiltonian Federalists asserted the theory that the
Constitution was a social compact that protected only "We the
People" of the several United States who were parties to it.
Aliens, by definition, were not parties to the Constitution,

86. In Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445, 478 (1899), Chief Justice
Fuller argued that Congress enjoyed "plenary power of legislation" over Indian
tribes, and that such power was "subject only to the Constitution of the United
States." Id.
87. See Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294, 308 (1902) ("The power
existing in Congress to administer upon and guard the tribal property, and the
power being political and administrative in its nature, the manner of its exercise
is a question within the province of the legislative branch to determine, and is not
one for the courts."); see also Sisseton & Wahpeton Bands of Sioux Indians v.
United States, 277 U.S. 424, 437 (1928) ("Jurisdiction over [the Indians] and their
tribal lands was peculiarly within the legislative power of Congress and may not
be exercised by the courts in the absence of legislation conferring rights upon
them such as are the subject of judicial cognizance." (citations omitted)); Tiger v.
Western Inv.Co., 221 U.S. 286, 311 (1911).
88. For criticisms of the persistence of the plenary power doctrine in the
immigration area, see Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States
Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV.
853 (1987); Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary
Congressional Power, 1984 SuP. CT. REV. 255; Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration
Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and
Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990); Peter H. Schuck, The
Transformationof ImmigrationLaw, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1984).
89. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318
(1936).
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enjoyed no rights under it, and received protection only from
the law of nations. Citing Vattel's works on international law,
the Federalists argued that because the law of nations
recognized the absolute right of a nation to expel aliens, the
Alien Act, which authorized the President to expel aliens whom
he considered security threats, violated no constitutional
provisions.9" Writing in defense of the act, state court judge
Alexander Addison articulated an early distinction between
domestic and foreign affairs, only the former of which he
considered governed by the Constitution.9 1 Madison responded
for the Jeffersonians that, although aliens may not have been
parties to the Constitution, "it does not follow that the
Constitution has vested in Congress an absolute power over
them. The parties to the Constitution may have granted, or
retained, or modified, the power over aliens, without regard to
that particular consideration."9 2
Congress did not address the admission and expulsion of
aliens again until it began regulating Asian immigration in the
1880s. Thus until the late nineteenth century, the Supreme
Court was not directly confronted with the need to address the
constitutional source of the immigration power. In the Head
Money Cases,9 3 the Court rooted the power in Congress's
authority to regulate foreign commerce. 94
Apparently
dissatisfied with that solution in an era of narrow Commerce
Clause interpretation, however, the Court in 1889 offered its
now-famous articulation of the classical plenary power
90. For an eloquent discussion of the theories of constitutional law
prevailing in the debates over the Alien and Sedition Acts, see Gerald L. Neuman,
Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909, 927-38 (1991).
91. See ALEXANDER ADDISON, ANALYSIS OF THE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE
OF THE VIRGINIA ASSEMBLY (1800), reprinted in 2 AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING
DURING THE FOUNDING ERA, 1706-1805, at 1055, 1070 (Charles S. Hyneman &

Donald S. Lutz eds., 1983).
The restrictions of the constitution are not restrictions of external and
national right, but of internal and municipal right. And power over
aliens is to be measured, not by internal and municipal law, but by
external and national law. It affects not the people of the United States,
parties and subjects to the constitution; but foreign governments, whose
subjects the aliens are.
Id.
92. Madison's Report on the Virginia Resolutions, reprinted in 4 DEBATES,
RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER PROCEEDINGS, IN CONVENTION, ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 556 (J. Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836).

93. 112 U.S. 580 (1884).
94. See id. at 595.
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doctrine.
The original Chinese Exclusion Case,95 presented the
question whether Congress could retroactively terminate the
right of a Chinese national to re-enter the United States, in
violation of a United States treaty with China.96 The plaintiff
had resided in the United States for twelve years prior to his
departure to China in 1887." 7 Upon his departure, and
pursuant to existing law, the plaintiff obtained a customs
certificate indicating that he was a United States resident and
was entitled to return to the United States.98 Eight days before
the plaintiffs return, Congress enacted legislation revoking the
right of Chinese nationals holding customs certificates to
return to the United States.9 The plaintiff was excluded in the
San Francisco Harbor and challenged the 1888 Act as violating
the treaty with China' 0 and rights vested under federal
statutes. The Supreme Court, through Justice Field, made no
effort to root Congress's authority in the commerce power or
elsewhere in the constitutional text.
Instead, after
acknowledging the power of Congress to abrogate a treaty with
later legislation, Justice Field concluded that Congress's
authority to legislate derived from sovereignty:
That the government of the United States, through the
action of the legislative department, can exclude aliens from
its territory is a proposition which we do not think open to
controversy. Jurisdiction over its own territory to that
extent is an incident of every independent nation. It is a

95.

Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130

U.S. 581 (1889).
96. See id. at 589.
97. See id. at 585 (argument for Appellant).
98. See id. at 586-87 (argument for Appellant).
99. See Act of Oct. 1, 1888, ch. 1064, § 1, 25 Stat. 504, 504 (1888).
100. See Article 6 of the 1868 treaty with China, which provided that
"Chinese subjects visiting or residing in the United States, shall enjoy the same
privileges, immunities, and exemptions in respect to travel or residence, as may
there be enjoyed by the citizens or subjects of the most favored nation." Treaty
with China, July 28, 1868, U.S.-China, art. VI, 16 Stat. 731, 740. A supplemental
treaty entered in 1880 authorized the United States to limit the immigration of
Chinese laborers into the United States, but confirmed that "Chinese laborers
who are now in the United States shall be allowed to go and come of their own
free will and accord, and shall be accorded all the rights, privileges, immunities,
and exemptions which are accorded to the citizens and subjects of the most
favored nation." Treaty with China, Nov. 17, 1880, U.S.-China, art. II, 22 Stat.
826, 827.
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part of its independence. If it could not exclude aliens it
would be
to that extent subject to the control of another
o
power.10
Field then offered support for the power to exclude based on a
broad concept of national security powers and selfpreservation:
To preserve its independence, and give security against
foreign aggression and encroachment, is the highest duty of
every nation, and to attain these ends nearly all other
considerations are to be subordinated. It matters not in
what form such aggression and encroachment come,
whether from the foreign nation acting in its national
character or from vast hordes of its people crowding in upon
us. The government, possessing the powers which are to be
exercised for protection and security, is clothed with
authority to determine the occasion on which the powers
shall be called forth; and its determination, so far as the
subjects affected are concerned, are 10necessarily
conclusive
2
upon all its departments and officers.
Thus, Field concluded, "[tihe power of exclusion of foreigners
[was] an incident of sovereignty belonging to the government of
the United States, as a part of those sovereign powers
delegated by the Constitution." °3 Congress's determination in
this regard was "conclusive upon the judiciary."' 4
Justice Field's contribution to the plenary power doctrine
in the immigration field presages Justice Sutherland's singular
contribution to the doctrine of Curtiss-Wright. Although while
sitting as a circuit justice, Field had invalidated local antiChinese legislation, he had simultaneously called for national
legislation to address the problem.0 " As a presidential hopeful

101.

The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 603-604.

102. Id. at 606.
103. Id. at 609.
104. Id. at 606.
105. See Ho Ak Kow v. Nunan, 12 F. Cas. 252, 256 (C.C.D. Cal. 1879) (No.
6546) ("[flor restrictions necessary or desirable in these matters, the appeal must
be made to the general government; and it is not believed that the appeal will
ultimately be disregarded"), discussed in SOME AccOUNT OF THE WORK OF
J. FIELD AS A LEGISLATOR, STATE JUDGE, AND JUDGE OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 390, 404-05 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1986) (1881);
In re Ah Fong, 1 F. Cas. 213, 217 (C.C.D. Cal. 1874) (No. 102) ("If their further
STEPHEN

immigration is to be stopped, recourse must be had to the federal government,
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in 1880 and 1884, he had urged Congress to protect the country
from "the oriental gangrene. "1°6 And in a vigorous dissent in
Chew Heong v. United States,"7 he had attacked the Chinese
race and invited the adoption of legislation restricting their
entry."' 8 Five years later, Justice Field authored the majority
opinion in Chae Chan Ping, which offered what was then the
strongest articulation of an implied, plenary congressional
power over immigration.1" 9
Again, the relationship between this doctrine and
constitutional constraints was uncertain. Like the Native
American plaintiff in Kagama, the plaintiff in Chae Chan Ping
did not contend that an individual constitutional right had
been violated, but only that Congress lacked authority to pass
the legislation. Three years later, however, a due process
challenge was raised to the exclusion statute in Ekiu v. United
States." o The Court took the opportunity to reaffirm and
strengthen the concept of inherent power to exclude aliens"'
and concluded that, in the exercise of such authority, "the
decisions of executive or administrative officers, acting within
powers expressly conferred by Congress, are due process of
law.""'
Finding that the minimal procedures required by
Congress had been satisfied, the Court rejected the alien's
claim.
3
The following year, in Fong Yue Ting v. United States,"
the Court extended the plenary power doctrine to the
deportation of lawful Chinese residents, holding that "[t]he
right of a nation to expel or deport foreigners, who have not

where the whole power over this subject lies.").
106.

PAUL KENS, JUSTICE STEPHEN FIELD 205 (1997).

107. 112 U.S. 536 (1884).
108. See id. at 560-78 (Field, J., dissenting).
109. For further discussion, see KENS, supra note 106, at 205-09; MILTON R.
KONVITZ, THE ALIEN AND THE ASIATIC IN AMERICAN LAw 10-11 n.29 (1946).
110. 142 U.S. 651 (1892).
111. See id. at 659. The Court reasoned as follows:
It is an accepted maxim of international law, that every sovereign nation
has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to selfpreservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its
dominions .... In the United States this power is vested in the national
government, to which the Constitution has committed the entire control

of international relations, in peace as well as in war.
Id.
112. Id. at 660 (emphasis added).
113. 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
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been naturalized or taken any steps towards becoming citizens
of the country, rests upon the same grounds, and is as absolute
and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their
entrance into the country."" 4 Relying heavily on the opinion in
Chae Chan Ping, the majority invoked the works of Vattel to
argue that the law of nations gave nations inherent authority
to expel aliens. 1 5
The Court concluded-without textual
support-that "[t]he Constitution of the United States speaks
with no uncertain sound upon this subject."' 16
The Court broadly suggested that congressional
determinations in this area were not proper questions for the
courts." 7 Nevertheless, the Court reviewed the procedures
afforded the plaintiff and suggested that they-particularly the
requirement that an alien prove his or her residence through
the testimony of a "credible white witness""--comported with
due process." 9 Apparently this extension of the plenary power
doctrine to aliens inside the United States was too much for
Justice Field. Although he had authored the Chae Chan Ping
decision, Field now dissented with a direct attack on the
inherent powers doctrine:
The government of the United States is one of limited and
delegated powers. It takes nothing from the usages or the
former action of European governments, nor does it take
any power by any supposed inherent sovereignty....
Sovereignty or supreme power is in this country vested in
the people, and only in the people. By them certain
sovereign powers have been delegated to the government of
the United States and other sovereign powers reserved to
the States or to themselves .... When, therefore, power is
exercised by Congress, authority for it must be found in
express terms in the Constitution, or in the means
necessary or proper for the execution of the power
expressed. If it cannot be thus found, it does not exist.'12°

114. Id. at 707.
115. See id. at 707-08.
116. Id. at 711.
117. See id. at 731.
118. Id. at 704.
119. See id. at 729 ("The competency of all witnesses, without regard to their
color, to testify in the courts of the United States, rests on acts of Congress, which
Congress may at its discretion modify or repeal.").
120. Id. at 757-58 (Field, J., dissenting).
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* [The Act] contains within it the germs of the
assertion of an unlimited and arbitrary power, in general,
incompatible with the immutable principles of justice,
inconsistent with the nature of our government, and in
conflict with the written Constitution by which121that
government was created and those principles secured.

Justices Fuller and Brewer also dissented, with Justice
Brewer launching a lengthy and eloquent attack on the
inherent powers doctrine:
It is said that the power here asserted is inherent in
sovereignty. This doctrine.., is one both indefinite and
dangerous. Where are the limits to such powers to be
found, and by whom are they to be pronounced? Is it within
legislative capacity to declare the limits? If so, then the
mere assertion of an inherent power creates it, and
despotism exists. May the courts establish the boundaries?
Whence do they obtain the authority for this?
...[T]he power to remove resident aliens is,
confessedly, not expressed. Even if it be among the powers
implied, yet still it can be exercised only in subordination to
the limitations
and restrictions imposed by the
122
Constitution.
In short, during the early 1890s, the concept of powers
inherent in sovereignty replaced the foreign Commerce Clause
as the basis for the federal power to exclude or deport aliens.

As in the Native American cases, the Court repeatedly
suggested that this power was sufficiently exclusive to preclude
judicial review.12
Although the opinions are rife with
inconsistencies regarding the relationship between the plenary
power doctrine and the constitutional text, by 1909 the
principle was sufficiently established for the Court to
pronounce that "over no conceivable subject is the legislative

121. Id. at 763.
122. Id. at 737-38 (Brewer, J., dissenting).
123. See, e.g., Lees v. United States, 150 U.S. 476, 480 (1893) (Congress's
"absolute" power to exclude is "not open to challenge in the courts"); Fong Yue

Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 706 (1893) (Congress's decisions are
"conclusive upon the judiciary"); Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892)
(power over entry "belongs to the political department"); Chae Chan Ping v.
United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889) (the
legislative power is "conclusive upon the judiciary").
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1 24
power of Congress more complete" than immigration.

C. Plenary Power over Territories
The third line of late nineteenth-century decisions critical
to the development of the inherent powers doctrine concerned
the authority of Congress to acquire and govern territories, and
the status of such territories vis-&-vis the existing states.
These issues emerged with the question of the United States's
power to make the Louisiana Purchase and remained a source
of debate throughout the nineteenth century. During this
evolution, judicial doctrines regarding congressional power over
the territories were significantly informed by doctrines
developed in the Indian and immigration contexts.
In an early case addressing the power to govern lateracquired territories, Justice Marshall had held that Congress's
constitutional power to establish courts for the territories was
either implicitly authorized by the war power or the treaty
power, or expressly authorized by Article IV,'2 5 though
Marshall's analysis also suggested a possible inherent basis for
the authority.'2 6 In language that would be invoked repeatedly
in the Insular Cases three-quarters of a century later,'27
Marshall observed that under the practice of nations, new
territory became a part of the nation "either on the terms
stipulated in the treaty of cession, or on such as its new master
shall impose."128
The authority of Congress to legislate for the territories, of
course, became embroiled in the debate over the extension of
slavery to the territories with the Missouri Compromise. In
Dred Scott v. Sandford,'29 after his infamous conclusion that
the Court lacked jurisdiction because Scott, as a member of the
Negro race, could not sue as a citizen of the United States,
Chief Justice Taney further held that the power to acquire and

124. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909).
125. See American Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 542,
546 (1828).
126. See id. at 543 ("The right to govern may be the inevitable consequence
of the right to acquire territory. Whichever may be the source whence the power
is derived, the possession of it is unquestioned.").
127. See, e.g., Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 302 (1901) (White, J.,
concurring).
128. American Ins. Co., 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 542.
129. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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govern new territories was derived from Congress's Article IV
authority to admit new states.13 ° This authority in the
territories, however, was simultaneously constrained by the
express and implied limitations of the Constitution:
The Territory being a part of the United States, the
Government and the citizen both enter it under the
authority of the Constitution, with their respective rights
defined and marked out; and the Federal Government can
exercise no power over his person or property beyond what
that instrument132confers, nor lawfully deny any right which
it has reserved.
Taney rejected any suggestion that either "implied or
incidental powers"133 or the law of nations3 could expand
congressional authority. Because the limitations of the Bill of
Rights applied to the territories, Taney concluded, the
protections of property in the Due Process Clause barred
135
Congress from prohibiting slavery.
A series of decisions after the Civil War confirmed Taney's
position that the Constitution and Bill of Rights applied to the
territories. 136 By the late nineteenth century, however, this
"continental equilibrium" 137 was being eroded in favor of a
theory of inherent powers. 38 In upholding the dissolution of
the Mormon Church in 1890,131 the Court noted that

130. See id. at 446-49.
131. See id. at 450-51.
132. Id. at 449-50.
133. Id. at 451.
134. See id.
135. See id. at 452.
136. See, e.g., Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U.S. 22 (1889) (right to jury trial);
Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878) (Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause);
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (First and Sixth Amendments); Rice
v. Railroad Co., 66 U.S. (1 Black) 358 (1861) (property rights).
137. See the discussion in Neuman, supra note 90, at 953-56.
138. See, e.g., Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 44 (1885) ("The people of the
United States, as sovereign owners of the National Territories, have supreme
power over them and their inhabitants.").
139. The Act of 1887 provided that "the acts of the legislative assembly of
the Territory of Utah incorporating, continuing, or providing for the corporation
known as the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints ... are hereby
disapproved and annulled, and the said corporation... is hereby dissolved." Act
of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 397, § 17, 24 Stat. 635, 638.
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[t]he power of Congress over the Territoies of the United
States is general and plenary ....The incidents of these
powers are those of national sovereignty, and belong to all
independent governments. The power to make acquisitions
and by cession is an
of territory by conquest, by treaty
140
incident of national sovereignty.
Although fundamental constitutional rights limited Congress's
power to legislate for the territories, the Court continued,
"these limitations would exist rather by inference and the
general spirit of the Constitution from which Congress derives
all its powers, than by any express and direct application of its
Chief Justice Fuller dissented with Justices
provisions." '
Field and Lamar, arguing that Congress enjoyed only
delegated, not inherent, authority, and that the Constitution
142
did not authorize the confiscation of property in this manner.
The same year in Jones v. United States,'4 ' the Court
invoked a variation of the discovery doctrine to hold that the
United States, as a result of nationhood, enjoyed the power to
acquire territory by discovery and occupation and to exercise
jurisdiction over it. "By the law of nations, recognized by all
civilized States, dominion of new territory may be acquired by
discovery and occupation, as well as by cession or conquest;
and... the nation... may exercise such jurisdiction and for
such period as it sees fit over territory so acquired."1 44 Jones
involved a challenge to Congress's extension of federal criminal
jurisdiction (via a delegation to the President) to a recently
discovered guano island in the Caribbean. 145 The Court found
that the Executive's determination that the United States
enjoyed sovereign control of the island was conclusive
regarding the authority of Congress to147legislate there146 and
was binding on the judicial department.

140. Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United
States, 136 U.S. 1, 42 (1890).
141. Id. at 44.
142. See id. at 67-68 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
143. 137 U.S. 202 (1890).
144. Id. at 212.
145. See id. at 209.
146. See id. at 213.
147. See id. at 221 ("[It is not material to inquire, nor is it the province of
the court to determine, whether the executive be right or wrong; it is enough to
know that in the exercise of his constitutional functions he has decided the
question.").
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These decisions culminated in the sweeping theory of
inherent federal authority over territories that was articulated
at the turn of the century in the Insular Cases. A full
treatment of the positions adopted by the various justices in
these cases is beyond the scope of this article, a few summary
observations are in order. Writing the judgment for a sharply
divided court in Downes v. Bidwell, 4" Justice Brown argued
that Congress's power to govern the new territories arose from
the power to acquire them, and that the Constitution did not
apply to such territories, except for certain express limitations
(such as the prohibition against bills of attainder) that the
Constitution imposed on the exercise of congressional power.149
Thus, Brown concluded, tariffs imposed on goods from Puerto
Rico did not violate the constitutional mandate that duties be
uniform throughout the United States,15 ° since that clause did
Brown asserted that the
not apply to the territories.
acquisition of territory brought with it the power to govern its
people as the ruling power saw fit.
Unwilling so completely to abandon the essentialist
regime, Justice Edward White, joined by three concurring
justices, argued that the Constitution remained the ultimate
but
source of congressional authority over the territories,'
largely
area was
power
in this
that Congress's
unconstrained.'5 2 In language strongly reminiscent of Johnson
v. McIntosh, White invoked the inherent authority of the
nation to conquer and govern "uncivilized" peoples:
It may not be doubted that by the general principles of the
law of nations every government which is sovereign within
its sphere of action possesses as an inherent attribute the
power to acquire territory by discovery, by agreement or
treaty, and by conquest. It cannot also be gainsaid that as a
general rule wherever a government acquires territory as a
result of any of the modes above stated, the relation of the
territory to the new government is to be determined by the

148. 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
149. See id. at 276-77.
150. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
151. See Downes, 182 U.S. at 290 (White, J., concurring).

152. See id. at 290-91 ("[Tlhere is no express or implied limitation on
Congress in exercising its power to create local governments for any and all of the
territories.").
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acquiring power in the absence of stipulations upon the
subject.
...
[If the conquered are a fierce, savage, and restless
people, [the conquering nation] may, according to the degree
of their indocility, govern them with a tighter rein, so as to
curb their 153"impetuosity, and to keep them under
subjection."

The assumption that such principles of international law were
rendered inapplicable to the United States by the Constitution,
White argued, "rests on the erroneous assumption that the
United States under the Constitution is stripped of those
powers which are absolutely inherent in and essential to
national existence."5 4
Both positions provoked the ire of the four dissenting
justices, who viewed Congress's power to govern the territories
as both derived from, and constrained by, the express terms of
the Constitution.15 5 Justice Harlan, in particular, struggled to
sustain the principles of the essentialist regime:
Although from the foundation of the Government this court
has held steadily to the view that the Government of the
United States was one of enumerated powers,.... we are
now informed that Congress possesses powers outside of the
Constitution, and may deal with new territory, acquired by
treaty or conquest, in the same manner as other nations
have been accustomed to act with respect to territories
acquired by them. In my opinion, Congress has no existence
and
can exercise no
authority outside
of the
Constitution .... The idea that this country may acquire
territories... and hold them as mere colonies or
provinces-the people inhabiting them to enjoy only such
rights as Congress chooses to accord them,-is wholly
inconsistent with the spirit
and genius as well as with the
15 6
words of the Constitution.
Justice Harlan further echoed Justice Brewer's dissent in Fong
Yue Ting:

153.

Id. at 300-02.

154. Id. at 311.
155. See id. at 357-58, 369 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 379-80 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
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It is one thing to give such a latitudinarian construction to
the Constitution as will bring the exercise of power by
Congress, upon a particular occasion or upon a particular
subject, within its provisions. It is quite a different thing to
say that Congress
may, if it so elects, proceed outside of the
157
Constitution.
Harlan's position, of course, did not prevail, and the Court in
later cases embraced Justice White's distinction between
incorporated and unincorporated territories to uphold
relatively unbridled congressional authority over the
territories.
As in the immigration and Indian contexts, then, the late
nineteenth century saw the doctrine of congressional authority
over territories evolve from a concept rooted in the Territory
and Treaty Clauses of the Constitution, and limited by the
Constitution's terms, to a power derived from international law
concepts of discovery and sovereignty, which were relatively
unhinged from judicial or constitutional constraint.
CONCLUSION

The series of cases discussed above demonstrates that in
the last decade of the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court
embraced the doctrine of inherent plenary power in a broad
range of cases touching on Native Americans, aliens, and
territories. In so doing, the Court rejected prior essentialist
doctrines in favor of concepts of authority inherent in
sovereignty that bore an uncertain relationship to the
enumerated and reserved powers in the Constitution and that
were considered largely immune from judicial review. The
decisions in Kagama, Lone Wolf, Chae Chan Ping, Ekiu, Fong
Yue Ting, Church of Latter-Day Saints, Jones, and the Insular
Cases all relied on concepts of inherent powers derived from
the international law concepts of discovery and sovereignty
that were substantially unhinged from constitutional text. The
doctrines developed in these areas are particularly striking in
contrast to the strict construction the Court imposed on
domestic constitutional provisions during the same period.1 5

157. Id. at 380.
158. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); In re Debs, 158 U.S.
564 (1895); Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895), affd on
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Thus, to the extent that a divorce occurred between the
nineteenth-century orthodoxy and the foreign affairs power, it
appears that the separation was substantially completed some
forty years before the decision in Curtiss-Wright. Although
Justice Sutherland's effort to locate the foreign affairs power
exclusively in the Executive was relatively novel, by 1936 the
Court's general willingness to abandon enumerated powers
analysis in cases touching on foreign affairs was well
Indeed, by the time Justice Sutherland
established.
articulated his theory of executive hegemony in Curtiss-Wright,
the Court was edging toward new concepts of individual rights,
due process, and the role of courts in adjudicating such rights,
which were fundamentally incompatible with the inherent
plenary power decisions of the 1890s. In this sense, Justice
Sutherland's theory of inherent powers was perhaps the
culmination of the old regime, rather than the harbinger of the
new.

reh'g, 158 U.S. 601 (1895); Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362
(1894).
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